UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

VS.

Case No. 19-CR-025-JDP

ALEXANDER KAWLESKI,

Madison, Wisconsin January 28, 2021

Defendant.

1:30 p.m.

STENOGRAPHIC TRANSCRIPT OF VIDEOCONFERENCE SENTENCING HEARING HELD BEFORE CHIEF JUDGE JAMES D. PETERSON

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff:

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BY: JOSEPH A. BUGNI

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Also Present:

Alexander Kawleski, Defendant Mariah Stieve, U.S. Probation Officer

CHERYL A. SEEMAN, RMR, CRR
Official Court Reporter
United States District Court
120 North Henry Street, Room 410
Madison, Wisconsin 53703
1-608-261-5708

1 (Called to order at 1:30 p.m.) 2 THE CLERK: Case No. 10-CR-25-JDP-1, the United 3 States of America v. Alexander Kawleski. Court is called 4 for sentencing. May we have the appearances, please? 5 MS. ALTMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 6 United States appears by Elizabeth Altman and Laura 7 Przybylinski Finn. THE COURT: Good afternoon to you. 8 9 MR. BUGNI: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 10 Bugni appearing on behalf of Alexander Kawleski. THE COURT: Good afternoon to both of you. 11 also note that Mariah Stieve is on the call with us. She 12 13 is the probation officer who prepared the presentence 14 report. 15 We were having some audio difficulties with my end of 16 some earlier proceedings and so I've got a different 17 microphone connected now and so I just want to confirm 18 that you can hear me okay. Ms. Altman, can you hear okay? 19 MS. ALTMAN: I can, Your Honor. Thank you. 20 THE COURT: Mr. Bugni? 21 MR. BUGNI: I can, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: All right. Very good. So we're here 23 for sentencing and we're proceeding by video teleconference because I have determined for the Court 24 25 that we can't proceed in person without imposing undue

risks on the participants in the case. But I think the interests of justice compel us to move forward with Mr. Kawleski's sentence despite that, but we can do it this way only if he agrees to proceed this way.

So, Mr. Kawleski, do you understand that you've got the right to appear before me for your sentencing?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: And you're willing to waive your personal appearance and proceed by videoconference.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. That's how we'll do it then. I've got a lot of material in this case and so I'm going to run down what I think are the main documents that I have reviewed in connection with the sentencing to see if I missed anything.

So I've got the presentence report. I've got objections really from both sides, two installments here from the defendant, which I will speak to momentarily.

And I've got an objection from the government and I've got an addendum that summarized the objections. And then I've got a revised presentence report and a sentencing memorandum from both sides.

And I've got letters in support of Mr. Kawleski, so thanks to his family members who took the time to write to me. I appreciate having that input. And then I also have

Mr. Kawleski's written allocution.

So that's what I've reviewed. Let me know if you think I have missed anything. I know there's a lot more paper that was filed. I think I have reviewed everything well beyond what I've cited here. But let's find out, for sentencing purposes, if I missed anything. Ms. Altman, anything on the government's side?

MS. ALTMAN: No, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Bugni?

MR. BUGNI: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Kawleski, I want to make sure that you have read the presentence report and reviewed it and the revised presentence report with your attorney. Have you done that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you have any other objections or concerns with the presentence report? Mr. Bugni has raised some to me which I will address in a minute, but are there any other concerns that you have?

THE DEFENDANT: No, not that I can think of right now. I mean, there was some things in the presentence report, but I can't really think of them right now.

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to give you another chance to speak before we're finished. So if, during our proceeding, something occurs to you that you

want to speak to, you'll get the chance to do that.

Okay. So I'm going to adopt the facts in the -well, let me ask this: There are certain factual
clarifications that were offered. Mr. Bugni, have those
been adequately reflected in the presentence report?

MR. BUGNI: They have, Your Honor, with one exception. And I should have filed a letter this morning. When I went over the addendum with Mr. Kawleski, he has another cracked tooth that he was concerned about, and that would be the only additional point to add to the clarifications.

THE COURT: All right. We will make a note of that and I'll ask Ms. Stieve to include a reference to that in a future submission to make sure that all of Mr. Kawleski's health concerns are addressed, if they still need it, when he gets into BOP custody.

Okay. So I guess this is probably as good a time as any -- well, let me just state this: I'm going to adopt the facts in the presentence report as the facts on which I will base my sentence. There's no plea agreement. But in determining the defendant's sentence, I will take into consideration the advisory sentencing guidelines and the statutory purposes of sentencing that are set out in Title 18 of the United States Code at Section 3553(a).

So let me walk down the objections. And I believe

the best way to do this is to look at document 103, which I think is Mr. Bugni's articulation of the objections that remained outstanding after the revised presentence report. Is that correct, Mr. Bugni?

MR. BUGNI: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So it's a useful setting out of the continued objections, so thank you for that.

So, Mr. Bugni, the first issue is whether

Mr. Kawleski should receive credit for acceptance of
responsibility. The government has already told me it
wouldn't support the third level of reduction. The basic
framework here is that generally, if you go to trial,
you're not going to get credit, but that's not an absolute
rule if the defendant doesn't contest the underlying facts
that otherwise demonstrates acceptance of responsibility.

But when I judge that, I'm to look at pretrial conduct, not just -- not post-trial conduct. So I got Mr. Kawleski's expression of remorse in his written allocution, but what pretrial conduct would you point to, Mr. Bugni, that would indicate that Mr. Kawleski has accepted responsibility?

MR. BUGNI: I would point to his apology to the victim in I believe 2016 and again in 2018. In fact, this is a personal matter between the family and he expressed

remorse and he apologized to her twice. The fact that, you know, he believed he destroyed the flash drive in 2016, it sort of, "Look, I'm away from this." This isn't someone who continued his criminal conduct after 2014.

As far as, you know, whether or not he pled guilty right away or what other court proceedings, I don't have that, Your Honor. But I do have that behavior that I can cite to you showing this is somebody who, even before he got caught, was remorseful. It's somebody who, you know, turned away from the criminal conduct and put it behind him.

THE COURT: I am not persuaded that Mr. Kawleski has demonstrated acceptance of responsibility before trial. This is not one of those unusual cases where, despite going to trial, I think that granting credit is nevertheless warranted. In fact, I think that a factual component of the charge actually was disputed rigorously even after trial and that was that he still had the flash drive, disputed that he made that flash drive and tried to put the creation of that flash drive on Tracey Brown.

And this is a case in which two minor victims had to testify at his trial as young adults. And so not only was the government put to the effort of the trial, the victims were put through the hours of the trial as well. So this is a case in which I think it's appropriate that there be

no credit for acceptance of responsibility.

The next issue is whether Mr. Kawleski should receive an enhancement for incapacitating a minor. Application Note 2 of the applicable guideline section says that it's broadly applicable and it cites the fact that basically it applies when the victim is incapacitated. And I think that I don't know that I have to make the specific finding that he incapacitated her for the purpose of conducting the sexual assault, but it is definitely true that he provided her the alcohol that led to her incapacitation and then took advantage of the situation and sexually assaulted her when she was unconscious. I saw the video. I do not believe that she was conscious during the sexual assault. So I will overrule that objection as well.

The next one is whether Kawleski should receive the enhancement for sadistic conduct. This objection I'm going to sustain. I agree that the sexual assault was psychologically traumatizing to the victim, but that was the kind of trauma that's collateral to virtually any sexual assault of a minor by an adult or really sexual contact with an adult. There's always an element of trauma in a case like this.

But reading that enhancement for sadistic conduct, that broadly would mean that it would apply in a vast range of cases in which there is sexual conduct between an

adult and an older minor victim. I think if there is penetration of a prepubescent minor, that is sadistic by definition, but this is not a case in which I see the conduct at issue here really was sadistic within the meaning of that enhancement. So although I agree psychological pain could constitute that kind of sadistic conduct, this psychological pain was just collateral to the fact of the assault anyway, so I will not apply that enhancement.

So should Mr. Kawleski receive the enhancement for being a parent or guardian. He was not literally a parent or guardian, but part of his main argument here about the context of these events was that he was in a marriage-like relationship with his partner, Theresa, that he had a family-like relationship with his own children that he shared with Theresa, but that also he was in a step-parent-like relationship with Amanda.

And so I think that it's somewhat inconsistent to disclaim being in the position of a parent or guardian with Amanda, given the importance of the relationship that he had with Theresa and the fact that Theresa -- I'm sorry, that Amanda considered Emma and Noah to be her brother and sister.

This was a family, I agree with that, and I will consider this in the context of that situation. Even

though it wasn't legally recognized as a marriage, nevertheless, I think that the enhancement applies. Again the application notes encourage broad application of that enhancement.

Then we've got the argument that Count 16 should be dismissed because it's a lesser included. Here's the basic problem that I see with that: People have cited to me the *Johnson* case out of the Ninth Circuit. That case says that possession is a lesser included of receipt of pornography and the Seventh Circuit suggested it might be willing to embrace that position.

But those aren't the two crimes that we're talking about. We are talking about production and possession. And if we take, as we must in analyzing the multiplicity issue under *Blockburger*, we take an elements-only analysis and we look at the elements of the one offense compared to the other to determine whether one is a lesser included.

And production and possession each have divergent elements. You don't need to possess pornography to produce it. You could produce child pornography by engaging a child in lewd conduct for purposes of transmission so that you never possess the representation that is created. But to possess it, you have to have a tangible representation or you have to access the representation. And you don't have to possess it to

produce it and so each of them has an element that the other does not.

So when I look at the Johnson case, it says, look, if you're going to charge the lesser included, it has to be based on a different factual predicate. We don't have that problem here in the first instance because production and possession are not lesser includeds of each other, so possession is not the lesser included. So they're separate crimes. They're not related in a greater and lesser included issue. So I will not dismiss Count 16 as being duplicitous. It's appropriate to convict on both because they're not lesser includeds.

Okay. So those are the rulings on those enduring motions. So the effect on the guideline calculation is that there is -- I believe that the enhancement then was -- that was a four-level enhancement I believe that I sustained the objection to, is that correct, on the sadistic conduct?

MR. BUGNI: Yes, Your Honor, that's correct.

THE COURT: Okay. So let's see.

MR. BUGNI: It won't actually matter, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It won't matter because we have 51.

If we take four away, then that's 47. We can only go as

high as 43. So the ultimate effect on the guideline is

25 | immaterial.

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             MR. BUGNI:
                         I'm sorry, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: I'm sorry?
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            MR. BUGNI: We had 51 in the original --
             THE COURT: Yeah.
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             MR. BUGNI: -- but I believe we have 47 in the
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   revised PSR. It would still only --
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             THE COURT: Reduce to a 43.
            MR. BUGNI: That's right, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: So we would reduce to 43 then.
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   a criminal history category III, the advisory guideline
   imprisonment range would still be life. And then given
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   the statutory maximum 30 years on the possession charge,
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   ten years on the -- I'm sorry, 30 years on the production
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   charge, ten years on the possession charge, gives us a
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   40-year statutory maximum which then becomes our guideline
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   calculation.
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         So, Ms. Altman, are you in agreement where we land in
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   the guidelines?
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            MS. ALTMAN: Yes, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Mr. Bugni?
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            MR. BUGNI: Yes, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT: Okay. All right. So that's as far
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   as the guidelines take us. I've got sentencing memoranda
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   from both sides, so you don't need to repeat those things,
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   but let me know if there is anything further that the
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parties want me to consider before I ask if Mr. Kawleski has anything to say. Ms. Altman.

MS. ALTMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. I will not repeat anything hopefully or much in my sentencing memorandum. I want to comment primarily on the sentencing memorandum filed by Mr. Bugni and also about the defendant. In the sentencing memorandum the defendant says he should be getting punished for, quote, "getting a 16-year-old drunk and having sex with her," end quote, and that this is otherwise isolated behavior.

The defendant's case and behavior in this case was a lot of things: it was grooming, it was rape, it was sexual assault, it was abusive conduct, it was exploitation, it was forceable sexual penetration, all of those things.

What it cannot be called, under any stretch of the imagination, is getting a 16-year-old drunk and having sex with her.

As far as the claim in the sentencing memorandum that the defendant has accepted beginning from the -- accepted responsibility from the beginning, I know the Court addressed it, but I think it bears repeating. The only person who's accepted responsibility for Mr. Kawleski's actions in this case is Mr. Bugni, and he has done so from the beginning, at least as far as the conduct that's shown in the video.

The defendant has continued to deny responsibility for the actions in this case up to and including the allocution that he filed yesterday in which he again blames Tracey Brown, says that he burned the thumb drive at issue, that this is something that she created. And now, taking it one step further yesterday, saying for the first time, at least that I recall, that she had been threatening him to turn over this thumb drive since 2015. So he's created this whole narrative, even as of yesterday, with his allocution.

Touching on a few other things in the defendant's allocution, everything that he says only amplifies the points in the government's sentencing memorandum about his history and characteristics. It seems to be primarily about how his actions have affected him. The lack of self-awareness in his allocution is staggering and is on display in the very first sentence of his allocution where he calls it, quote, "an unfortunate situation." This isn't an unfortunate situation. He sexually assaulted and raped a girl that he had a close relationship with that he had been grooming for a period of time.

He claims to have made all of these changes after the offense. That may or may not be true. It's hard to tell, especially based on this allocution that he wrote, but that's a very small part of this case. He continues to

challenge his conviction, as I've already indicated. He blames Tracey Brown for all of these issues at this point. He can't even admit that the victim was unconscious because that doesn't seem to fit this narrative that he's now trying to sell.

It appears, and I read this several times, I hope I'm wrong, but it appears that he's now trying to say that the conduct between him and the victim was somehow mutual. He claims they leaned on each other. He told her that she wasn't at fault and they mutually resolved to leave the past behind them and move forward in an appropriate manner. That's just offensive. That is beyond offensive. If he's now trying to say that she was some willing participant in this behavior and that they've decided to move on more appropriately, he's got bigger problems than even imagined when this case started.

The victim reported not even knowing that this conduct happened. It wasn't mutual. She was passed out, drunk, and he violently assaulted her. He raped her. And if he doesn't get that, he's a tremendous danger to the community. And if he does get that and he's just trying to manipulate the Court into this narrative that he now wants the Court to believe, he's still a danger to the community.

He deserves to be out of commission for as long a

period of time as possible. And at that point, based on I'm not dismissing the Court's earlier decision, that's 40 years and the government recommends that sentence, Your Honor.

I'm somewhat surprised. I say only somewhat surprised because I know that this has been traumatic for Amanda, but I didn't get any witness or victim statements and so I'm wondering if there is anything from the victims. So I didn't get any corroboration of the apology and agreement to move forward. But I even reviewed the trial testimony and that really didn't touch on any of the trauma or the impact of the crime on Amanda, although I could tell from her demeanor that she was upset by the whole affair and I know that she said that she wasn't aware of it and she was upset when she found out about it. But I guess my question is any input from the victim on any of this?

MS. ALTMAN: We did not get any victim input,
Your Honor, we didn't. We reached out to them. We sent
them notice. Neither one responded to either the
probation office or our office.

As far as the apology, I don't think it could have happened because she didn't know about the conduct, so I think that's just not even true. But to answer your direct question, no, there's no victim impact.

THE COURT: All right. Then the other set of questions I have is you cited the *Irey* case -- and for the benefit of the court reporter, it's I-R-E-Y -- the Eleventh Circuit case. I have to say, that case is quite an outlier, both legally and factually, factually because the defendant in that case engaged in very protracted, ghastly conduct that involved a sadistic sexual assault of at least 50 child victims, prepubescent victims, and so that conduct is far beyond what we have in this case.

It's also an outlier in that it's one of those rare decisions in which an appellate court reverses a trial court's determination of a reasonable sentence. And so I wanted to ask about the cases that you cite and try to understand how I'm supposed to consider them, because even Mr. Irey, as ghastly as he was, he only got 30 years.

And some of the other cases that were cited with some very long sentences from the Seventh Circuit, those were upheld as reasonable sentences. It wasn't that those sentences were specifically endorsed; they were held to be within the range of reasonableness. But those too involved much more serious conduct and the distribution of pornography through websites directed at people who are interested in that kind of thing and I don't have that distribution element here.

And the bottom line here is that Mr. Kawleski's

conduct, as bad as it was, and it was serious, just isn't in the same league as some of those other sentences of a hundred years or even 40 years in some of those other cases.

MS. ALTMAN: Well, Your Honor, there are two things. They're cited -- Irey is cited a lot for the principles that, you know, we need to protect our children and do whatever it takes to protect our children. And so when you look at that and when you look at Mr. Kawleski and what he's done and his current attitude, that remains. We need to protect our children.

As far as how it compares to other sentences, I mean, his conduct -- I mean, his conduct was bad. We don't know how often he did it. Amanda reported that she woke up other times feeling sore. I don't think that we can say this is a one-time thing, particularly because had the Court not dismissed the other charges, I mean, we have however many charges of production now that he touched them. In the shower videos he didn't. But it's an extended course of conduct that he engaged in and I think that that's something that the Court needs to consider. It wasn't just a single incident.

THE COURT: I definitely will consider that. But when I'm looking at points of comparison -- and honestly, just let me tell you, my perspective is I'm very cautious

about looking at other cases that I can see only through the appellate record and looking at the ultimate sentence and I have a description of the offense conduct, but I do not have the kind of rich information that I have when I sentence somebody myself. So I'm very cautious about looking at some other case where somebody else convicted under the same statute gets an extraordinary sentence, because I just don't know all of the information that went into that sentence.

And so I understand your point that I could be upheld as making a reasonable determination if I did impose the statutory maximum here, partly because that's a guideline sentence and so it's presumed to be reasonable for appeal purposes, but that doesn't really guide me to what the right sentence is in this case. And when I look at those cases, I see very much more atrocious behavior in most of them.

MS. ALTMAN: Well, I think, Your Honor, then if you don't consider those other cases and you want to look specifically at what this defendant did, and we do encourage that in the sentencing memo -- I think it says -- I know that it says "understanding that you're sentencing this defendant for these actions" -- I think he still warrants that type of sentence.

He engaged in -- I know he denies it, but it sure

seems like he's engaged in this conduct before with multiple girls. He had a daughter who was coming into that sort of age. I'm not saying he did anything at all with her, but that was possibly coming up next. He took numerous videos of the victim in this case. He seemed to be obsessed with her. He created videos about her. He continues to deny his responsibility. He has complete lack of self-awareness. He's only interested in himself and how this has affected him and his reputation.

So if you disregard all of those other cases and just look at this case and what you have in front of you and the things that you should look at, he still warrants a really really long sentence.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Bugni.

MR. BUGNI: Thank you, Your Honor. I think I'm going to begin with where Ms. Altman began and that is my sentencing memo. I was a little concerned if I would have actually written that in the sentencing memo, because it has a tin ear, but I'd like to read what I actually wrote in my sentencing memo. "Getting a 16-year-old drunk, having sex with her, and then later secretly videotaping her in the shower is absolutely repugnant." That's my quote. That's exactly what I said when I wrote it on page 2. And that's the way this case is, it's very difficult and it's very atrocious. It is atrocious. I've never

backed away from that.

But where do we punish a person who's engaged in this and I think the Court has asked. We can look at other circuit cases, we can look at court of appeals cases. But I can just look at the other cases that I've appeared before you with, but I don't really think that's very helpful, like John got X and so I want X minus two or X plus two.

But I would look, Your Honor, at Steiskal, the man raped a 10-month-old and then sent it to another minor, 15 years. I'd look at John Gilbert, had sex with a 16-year-old multiple times, arranged gang bangs, videotaped it, sent it to other people and then also videotaped himself with another girl or took photos, 10 years. I'd look at Raimondi, who molested a seven-year-old, 12 years. I'd look at Hosler, who traveled here from Texas to have sex with a 10-year-old that he was going to purchase -- or 12-year-old, sorry, that he was going to purchase and then videotape it, 10 years. So when you look at like what's a reasonable sentence here --

THE COURT: I would add to that inventory Leroy Bond, 25 years.

MR. BUGNI: I think that was a little distinguishable, Your Honor, and I would put that

distinguishable on three levels. One, he was very scary in that he had done it to multiple girls. There was the seduction there of the -- I don't know the right -- the girl with mental disabilities. That was a real driver there. You know, she was 14, she was slow. I don't remember if she had Down syndrome or what it was, but she was mentally -- she had mental impairments. There was also getting the girl drunk and taking her virginity at the party. That was just atrocious. And then there was the escalating abuse there as well as he was out of control. So Leroy Bond, at 25, he's very distinguishable.

And, Your Honor, when I wrote in my sentencing memo that if he would have been caught in 2015 or 2014 or 2013, I think you would have really -- I think you probably would have gone north of 15 years, I really do. I've appeared before you enough and I think Leroy Bond kind of lingered in my head. I saw this as like a 17-year case. I'd still ask for 15, but I think that would be reasonable. I would say that in Leroy Bond I asked for 18. I asked for an entire -- you know, I think I called it like an entire lifetime as a juvenile.

But here you have Kawleski turning the ship. And I do not discount that he was a dangerous, out-of-control person in 2013 and 2014, but 2015 he makes a change. And we can look at this circumstance of specific behavior that

is spanning that time -- huge alcohol issues, a deteriorating relationship and just creeping behavior, sexually inappropriate behavior -- all of it terrible and that calls for certain punishment. But now we've removed it five years -- really seven years now if we take the two years, you know, we're past this -- and we have a different person and you're going to drive home a message.

And I hope you at least acknowledge the instrumental goals of sentencing. This isn't really about having to keep society safe as much as a Leroy Bond case and it's not about deterrence. This isn't somebody who we have the inklings that he's going to go back to this sort of behavior. I just don't see that.

I agree that there's troubling behavior and it's criminal behavior in 2013 and 2014, but after that you have that complete absence. If he really is that immersed in this, then there's going to be fragments of it.

There's going to be something that would show up in all of the downloads and all of the investigation that the police did, something -- some interest in children, some other victim speaks out, something -- but it's not there. And it goes to the credit of his consistent story about what was going on in his life.

Now, Your Honor, I think lingering in all of this is whether or not you believe him, if you believe him that he

threw out the flash drive. I can only say that's been the story from day one. Do you believe him that he apologized to Amanda? Like that's been his story since day one. "I was out there, a cigarette, she was going to move back in." You know, "It was terrible. It was the worst time of my life. I've apologized to her twice," and they resolved never to speak of it again.

Now, there are two aspects of it. You can look at it and say is it only this one time that I'm punishing, this one time that he got her drunk and sexually assaulted her, or was there something greater going on, something even more nefarious, but something that he also turned his back on, and that's what the more troubling is. Because if he's apologizing twice, you're apologizing for something that somebody has no memory of, you're apologizing for something that you know deep down what you did is wrong and another person knows what you did is wrong, that's what he's been consistent in and that actually fits with everything else in this case.

I only cite two other parts of it, Your Honor. One, the last time we have anything on that flash drive is 2015 and that was with -- that was early 2015 with the adult pornography that had been put on there. Second, we have someone who has every aspect of desiring to be an exceptional father. And I'm not saying like -- he had a

stepfather relationship with Amanda. And I agree that's just horrendous. It's so frickin terrible what he did. But you have this complete immersion in his children's life and everybody agrees about that, that like this is somebody who put away the alcohol, who put away all the distractions, who put away those aspects of it and was trying to be something for them in the midst of now being a single father.

And you have to ask yourself, is there the possibility that he was able to right the ship without getting caught and without that punishment. And then ask yourself the deeper question, and I think this is what drives it, Your Honor -- I don't know what you would give if you could go underneath 15 years. I don't even know if you're going to go under 15 years. I'm hoping you are -- but could he have righted that ship and, if so, what would he feel in the midst of having that brought back up.

He's turned his life away from the very worst thing that he ever did, that anyone could ever do, put it behind him, and then it's brought out and he's facing the consequences as a new man. And in facing the consequences as a new man, this is what we have: an apology, we have no other evidence of child pornography, we have nothing else touching that flash drive, and we have his remorse.

And one other thing -- I wish I would have said this

when you said the acceptance of responsibility -- now part of it is this man has cried more and shown more remorse, and not in a manipulative way, but in a "Holy cow, the whole world is crashing down on me" way. That's been consistent through the bond hearings, through every aspect of this, through the trial. You saw it. We had to continue trial for three hours so he could compose himself. This is somebody who's racked with his life that he thought he had turned away from and the life he was going towards is completely ripped away.

I would add only one other comment to what you had said earlier. Your Honor, I've tried enough cases before you. You know I wouldn't want to put a victim on the stand. We offered to stipulate to have, you know, whatever they needed. We did not want them on the stand. And it was not because it would further our defense or take away from our defense. Our defense was what it was. We won 15 counts or 14 counts. But this was not something that he took any joy in having them testify or there was any other aspect to it. He wept throughout that.

Your Honor, you're looking at somebody in a very rare position: being caught six years after the worst thing he ever did. And I ask you, when you're judging the moral and the instrumental goals of sentencing, to think deeply about that, to think deeply about like has this man really

changed and does it need to be a day over 15 years. I think that somewhere along the line he's paid his debt and it doesn't have to be 181 months. 180 months more than fits that bill.

THE COURT: Let me ask you a couple of questions. You said that Mr. Kawleski has turned his life around, put away the drinking. But in his residence, after the search, they found marijuana and cocaine in his residence.

MR. BUGNI: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: He didn't -- you could say it got worse. Now that he doesn't drink, he uses hard drugs.

MR. BUGNI: He did admit to using cocaine with Tracey Brown I think twice in the PSR. I don't have the exact paragraph. You know, I tend to think -- I think cocaine is a bad drug, but I would think drinking out blackout drunk is a little bit more dangerous. As far as marijuana goes, he shouldn't have had marijuana. But I meant it on the spectrum of he put away the alcoholism that was defining his life and getting drunk with a 16-year-old, doing that behavior, also like ramming his car into someone.

THE COURT: As I understand your -- the core of your argument is that this was aberrant behavior and it was driven by a dark moment in his life. But you have to look to 2009. He's got a conviction for sexual contact

with a minor in 2009. He denies it now, but he pled guilty to it. And so I know there's an excuse for it, he offers a justification, but that is a huge dent in his credibility.

MR. BUGNI: Yes, that is. And I'll just -- can I make two observation that I probably should have done earlier? One, he pled no contest. It's different than federal court where you've got to eat it and you've got to say what you did. You know, you can say, "I plead no contest, Your Honor."

Second, if the government -- you know, the government's sentencing memo is really "Look, 2005 he did this. She wrote it in her diary." But when I went to the discovery this morning, and they say it in their sentencing memo, "She ripped out the pages." But then in 2009, the friend who, you know, accused him said, "I saw the diary. I saw that." Well, if, in 2005, the cops couldn't find it, I don't think in 2009 that victim found it.

But I'd also put in this: If those things happened, what is he doing getting a fourth degree sexual assault? What is he doing getting two years probation and conditional jail time, meaning he didn't even actually have to sit in jail? Like if those things really happened, the DA up there knows how to hit him. The DA

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29 there has to answer to the people. And if the DA really believed that he had done these things, that he was that predator, then he would have actually -- he or she would have actually really hit him. Now, I'm not saying that he's the most credible person, that, you know, you're going to believe him to the bank, but his story does make sense and there is a lot of evidence to support it. THE COURT: Well, there's also evidence going the other way, because in 2009 Amanda corroborates the friend's claim of victimization. MR. BUGNI: Your Honor, that's what's in the police report. If that really held up, then what's that DA doing? Why not actually push that? There are lots of cases --THE COURT: Because cases like that are hard to win. MR. BUGNI: I don't know if they are that hard to If the facts were that clear, then that's not a hard win. That's whether did he actually come in case to win. there. "I have two witnesses who say he did."

THE COURT: All right. How about this: He didn't want to put the victims on the stand to have to go through it.

MR. BUGNI: There could have been lots of

reasons, Your Honor. But if he was that bad a dude, then you would actually push it and you would do it. And us hypothesizing now, you know, about whether it did or didn't happen, how much more of a sentence does that aggravate? If this would have been close together and there hadn't been that six-year break, I'd say yes, Your Honor, you have legitimate concerns. But those legitimate concerns I think are wiped away around year '13, '14, '15.

But is this aberrant behavior? Maybe even within a time period of his life, from 2009 to 2014, I give you that. He's hell on wheels. He's terrible. But 2014 to 2019 he's doing great, five years of entrenched every day getting up and going to work, five years of taking care of those two kids. That speaks as loud or louder than those five years of aberrant behavior that are really rooted in a dysfunctional relationship and alcoholism.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MR. BUGNI: Unless you have other questions, Your Honor, I think Mr. Kawleski has a few words.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Kawleski, you've got the right to address me before I decide on your sentence. You don't have any obligation to say anything, but I'd be eager to hear from you, so go ahead.

THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I guess I don't really know what to say. I mean, I want to say I'm sorry

to everybody, Amanda and Kya, Noah and Emma -- I love you more than everything in the world -- my mom, Keith, Ethan and Evan. I miss you all so much.

I can't deny, you know, what I did. I feel absolutely disgusted by it. And I've been trying to get past that in working to put that behind me. But I'm sorry, everyone, I'm sorry. I don't know what else to say. My mom, Ethan, Noah and Emma, my dad too, I love you all so much. I'm sorry I let all of you down. I tried. I tried so hard to get away from that. That's why it's hard for me to talk about it now, because I hate that part of me. I don't know what else to say.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else or are you finished?

THE DEFENDANT: No, I'm -- thank you.

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to take a recess here for a few minutes and then we'll come back and finish up the sentencing, so just hold on for a few moments. Thank you.

(Brief recess.)

THE COURT: All right. I'm going to organize my comments along the lines of the 3553(a) factors. We've discussed the case extensively. We've all been dealing with it for a long time. I think we're all very familiar with the basic facts, but I have to start out with the

characterization of the offense.

This is a sexual assault of a minor. She was unconscious. She was in a stepdaughter-like relationship with the defendant. That is a very serious offense. And the insult to the victim was greatly amplified by the defendant making a video recording of it and by his preservation of that video for an extended period of time, even if I credit his explanation that he thought he got rid of it in 2015. I'm skeptical of that because of the existence of the flash drive that was charged in this matter.

I don't have very direct evidence of the trauma to the victim. I think it was traumatizing. I can understand the betrayal that the victim justifiably feels. Mr. Kawleski should have been her protector. They were all going through a traumatic period when Theresa was abusing alcohol and was in a very bad state. Amanda should have been able to lean on Mr. Kawleski and he betrayed that very fundamental trust. It's really -- it is an atrocity, I have to agree with that, but I don't have further statements about the trauma to the victim. I recognize that it's there, but I don't have the details there.

I will observe that there was no distribution of the video, which sets this case apart from many of the others

that garnered sentences of several decades in which somebody not only went through the kind of experience of being sexually assaulted and photographed, but then the photographs were distributed widely. So that is a very big difference between this crime and the many that are in the cases that were cited to me.

Turning to the defendant, I think I need to make this observation, that he is not a pedophile. He is not attracted to prepubescent children. And that puts him in a different category because pedophilia is a much more intractable disorder and therefore it poses a greater threat to more vulnerable victims.

And so I think it's important when Mr. Kawleski says he doesn't want to be lumped in with the more violent pedophiles. He has a point. He's not in the same category as some of the offenders that are in the other cases who have sexually abused prepubescent children, you know, some very young ones.

But that's not to diminish the risk that the defendant poses because of his sexual interest in underage girls. I've got other offenders that I've sentenced and have to supervise and an interest in underage victims is itself an enduring difficulty that poses a great risk to vulnerable victims, not as vulnerable as those that are the objects of the pedophile's attention, but it's just --

it's a different category. It's still a problem.

As I said, the defense's main argument is that the crime was an aberration from a dark period. I'm just simply not completely persuaded by that. I don't find Mr. Kawleski really an entirely credible historian. I don't begrudge him his degree of self-pity. I think it would take an act of super-human selflessness not to think about what's in his future when he's facing a 15-year mandatory minimum and a guideline sentence of 40 years.

So I understand his regret over the entire situation and the impact that it will have on him and his family.

That doesn't mean that he doesn't have remorse over it.

And I think it's very understandable that a lot of what he's concerned about is what is happening to him or what has happened to him.

It's important to just make it crystal clear, however, that we are only here in this unfortunate situation because of his conduct. He is the one that put us all here. He put the victims here, he put all of us here, he put his family here, he put his children here. It's all on him. He is the only person who really did anything wrong and really bears any responsibility for this.

And he can resent Tracey Brown for bringing that evidence to the police. But whatever her motivations are,

she brought the truth to light.

The defendant acted on his attraction to minors over a period of years. I think there's pretty good evidence of some sexual touching of Amanda as early as 2005. But we've got the prior offense to another victim in 2009. He pled to it, he pled no contest. And he denies it now, but I think there's pretty good evidence to believe that that took place.

And then we've got the sexual assault of Amanda. But then we've got the surreptitious videos that were made over a period between 2013 and 2014. And he manipulated those videos and the video that he made of the sexual assault of Amanda and preserved them at least until 2015, and that's crediting his purported destruction of them.

And so he wasn't convicted of any federal crime on the basis of the bathroom videos, but it demonstrates a couple of things. One, this is an enduring pattern of misconduct driven by a sexual interest in underage girls and it demonstrates his complete willingness to take vulnerable people close to him, who depended on him, and use them for his own purposes, either without -- completely without their awareness. It is an extremely manipulative and heartless thing to do.

And so to me, I have a hard time accepting that this was just an aberration that was driven by a breakup. I'll

also note this: Going through a bad breakup and having the trauma of having a person that you love kill themselves through alcohol abuse is very traumatic and it might lead one to their own drug abuse. But the expression of that trauma of his own to turn to sexual abuse of his stepdaughter or the person in his stepdaughter-like role is really atrocious. I don't find that really much of a mitigating factor at all. She was going through a trauma at the same time. And as far as I'm concerned, it appears that that's part of what he took advantage of.

The crime did go undiscovered for several years and he claims to have turned his life around. I agree that there's no evidence of any further sex offenses after -- in the last few years and so I'm not going to speculate that there were other victims. I have absolutely no evidence of that.

But as I pointed out, when he was arrested, there was cocaine, drug paraphernalia, marijuana. And substance abuse is offered as one of the drivers of his misconduct of his crimes in the 2013 to 2015 range because of the difficulties he was going through. Well, his substance abuse is going, you know, going forward with other drugs and so I think that represents a continued risk factor.

As I said, I don't hold it against him that he expresses regret and concern for his own well-being

because of the punishment that he's facing. I take it -I do believe that he sincerely regrets that what he did,
but that doesn't mean that he's not capable of repeating
it.

So I have to come up with a sentence that serves the needs of sentencing. I agree with Mr. Bugni that promoting respect for the law, providing just punishment and reflecting the seriousness of the offense is a primary driver of the sentence here. It's not mere vindictiveness. I think it's part of justice because it reflects the harm to the victims and demonstrates that the crime has been taken seriously. The sentence does have to be a fair one so it's not out of line with the offense itself and I will acknowledge that the mandatory minimum is itself guite a long sentence.

I'm not persuaded by Mr. Bugni's argument though that deterrence is not a factor here because I do believe that looking at the evidence in the case as a whole, there's a strong indication that Mr. Kawleski is attracted to underage girls and that he's acted on it in the past and not just in the occasions that we saw recorded in the videos that were presented.

And so I think that there is a need for specific deterrence, which dovetails with the consideration of whether there's a need to protect the public. My concern

that he has this interest that he's acted on in the past, regardless of his regret of his crimes, means that I think there's a concern that he might reoffend. I am not at all persuaded that this is a case in which deterrence is irrelevant.

Sex offender treatment is available in prison just like it's available outside of incarceration, so the need for treatment provides no basis for not imposing a term of incarceration. He can get the treatment that he needs in prison. Sentences available require me to impose a term of incarceration of at least 15 years, so the term is really what is at issue.

Let me say a few words about the guidelines. I've said it before, I'll repeat it here again: I disagree on policy grounds with the pornography guideline for two reasons. It's not driven by empirical research on the historical practices of sentencing; it's driven by congressional concern about the seriousness of child pornography.

Everybody in the world agrees that it's a serious offense, but they are mandating that the sentences be driven by the mandatory sentences that they've -- the term of incarceration. The maximum term and the mandatory minimum terms doesn't mean that those sentences are going to be effective at all. And there's no empirical research

that suggests that these guideline sentences have been vetted in any way or verified in any way to actually be effective deterrence and so it really is an aberration in the way the guidelines are usefully developed from historical sentencing practices.

I also disagree with the guidelines' focus on general deterrence. I think that, as a general matter, I have qualms about whether there's any good evidence that criminal activity is really subject to deterrence on the basis of the length of sentence. All of the research that I have tracked and followed suggests that the certainty and swiftness of punishment has a deterrent effect, but the actual sentence length really does not.

There's recent study from the Sentencing Commission trying to correlate recidivism and length of sentence and they came up with the barest of correlation that suggests that longer sentences are a slight specific deterrence.

There's nothing to support the idea of general deterrence other than a general idea that criminals engage in some sort of cost-benefit analysis in which they factor in the length of sentence they might receive in their conduct.

Well, I think this case demonstrates a pretty good example of how the individual decision-maker just doesn't engage in that kind of decision-making, so I don't think the sentence I impose here today will have the slightest

impact on anyone else.

I do think that it's important to send a message that we have taken the crime seriously to reflect the victim's experience and that we take it seriously, but the idea that this will have an actual deterrent effect on some other person who's going to sexually assault someone I think is very unrealistic.

I'll also note this, that the pornography guidelines are very concerned with the pornography market and that's just not a factor here, because there was no distribution of the pornography in this case, so this isn't a case in which we're trying to accomplish drying up the pornography market by sentencing Mr. Kawleski.

The sentencing disparities I think really are an important factor here because in the absence of useful guidance from the guidelines themselves, I do have to look at comparable cases and sort of see what makes sense, what seems fair, because it's appropriate to consider other victims.

And I will note that I thought of both Mr. Bond and Mr. Gilbert as points of comparison because they involved teenage victims. And Mr. Gilbert really got a very short sentence for his conduct. Partly it's driven by factors that aren't really the offense itself, but the individual characteristics of the defendant. But he got ten years.

Mr. Bond got 25 years.

I think I disagree with Mr. Bugni that the cases are so remarkably different. There are of course points of distinction with all of these cases. But just in terms of rough measures, I think I've got to be -- if Mr. Bond gets 25 years, I don't think it would be appropriate for Mr. Kawleski to get 40 years.

Restitution I don't believe is an issue here because I've got to give him at least 15 years, so I don't think whatever extra time that I add to it would affect the likelihood of any restitution being paid.

So when I balance all of those factors, I think that I tried to slot Mr. Kawleski into as appropriate a spot in the spectrum of child pornography defendants that I have, I think a sentence of 18 years is appropriate. I think it's more than the mandatory minimum and it's driven upward by his history of a prior sex offense and the enduring nature of the offense conduct that I have here:

That he preserved those photographs, manipulated them and kept them -- or the videos, I should say.

If there were a more robust statement of victimization, if the crime itself were even more catastrophic than I think it is, I might have been inclined to go longer. And again I don't mean to diminish the experiences of the victims. I want them to feel that

justice has been done as well. That's an important part of what I'm trying to accomplish here today.

But I hope they understand they did nothing wrong and I hope that they move on and recognize that their being taken advantage of by Mr. Kawleski should be a small part of their lives going forward. Unfortunately, it is often not the case, that it ends up with an enduring inability to trust people because someone so close to you has betrayed a trust so important, as Mr. Kawleski did, but I hope that they can keep it in perspective and move forward.

So the sentence I impose is 18 years of incarceration. That will be followed by 20 years of supervised release. A long period of supervised release is necessary to make sure that Mr. Kawleski doesn't act on his attraction to teenage girls again and so I impose a long period of supervised release. But I think 20 years, combined with the period of incarceration, will be sufficient to protect the public.

Ms. Altman is correct that nothing is as protective as incarceration. But I believe that the 18 years of incarceration is an appropriate period to have that kind of protection and 20 years of supervision provides the remaining reduction of the risk.

So we haven't gotten any specific requests for

restitution. Mr. Bugni presents in his brief that the offense was committed before the effective date of the statute that would require the mandatory restitution.

Ms. Altman, do you agree with that? Is that off the table now?

MS. ALTMAN: I do agree with that, Your Honor.

And I would also add, even if it were post statute,

without a request, the mandatory doesn't apply.

THE COURT: All right. And so I don't believe I've got even a suggestion that I've got restitution coming and so I don't see any need to order restitution then. Is that correct, Ms. Altman?

MS. ALTMAN: That's my understanding, Your Honor.

restitution. Let's see. Might as well address the objections to the conditions of supervision. The bottom line is that I think they're all justified and there are no prohibitions of anything that Mr. Kawleski might actually want to do, like travel outside the district. It's just that he has to disclose it and get approval. And so, for example, I won't overrule that one because I think it's a very important part of monitoring of most defendants, but particularly one with who's conduct is surreptitious. And so I think knowing where Mr. Kawleski is I think is an important part of supervision, so that's

overruled.

Concerning Condition No. 10, I think that's the work as an informant. The only way that Mr. Kawleski could work usefully as an informant, it seems to me, is in an investigation of a child pornography offense. And if that would happen, I would want to know about it, I would want a supervising officer to know it, so there is no reason not to impose the condition that he not work as an informant without getting approval first.

The restrictions on his devices, I think that in this day and age it's almost necessary as a condition of life that you have a device that records video and audio and I do not mean to prohibit this from Mr. Kawleski. But just as it's almost an unavoidable feature of modern life, it also unavoidably provides Mr. Kawleski the opportunity to reoffend.

And so I do not anticipate and expect that he will be deprived of normal existence in the modern world after his term of incarceration, but I do think that it's critically important that if he has audio or recording devices that we know what they are and so I think that's an important point of supervision.

I will overrule the objection to the polygraph.

They're not admissible as evidence in court, but they are a useful supervision tool. To put it really succinctly,

it keeps people under supervision for sex crimes honest if they have to face a polygraph examination and so I think that is an appropriate condition as well. The conduct was localized to Amanda and her friend on the shower videos, but we had a prior offense that he pleaded guilty to as well and so I'm going to recommend that. I'm going to impose that condition as well.

At this point I'm not going to limit it to female minors. I agree there's no suggestion that he has any interest in boys. But that gets to, in my mind, a very fine-grained distinction that if you're involved with activities with minor boys, it's quite possible that somewhere in the area minor girls will be there, too. And again there's no prohibition, absolute prohibition, but it requires disclosure, consent and approval.

And Condition No. 21, the same logic applies to Condition No. 21 about work where there are children under the age of 18, so that objection is overruled as well.

I will ask whether there are any further objections and whether Mr. Bugni and Mr. Kawleski would like me to read the rest of the conditions into the record.

Mr. Bugni.

MR. BUGNI: No, Your Honor. We would waive reading and we have no further objections other than those previously stated.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Kawleski, I'll say two more things about the conditions. They can be adjusted. During your supervision, if you make a motion to the Court, we will reconsider those conditions at the time or before you begin your supervision. The government or the probation office also can make a request to modify the conditions, so they can be changed.

I'll also say this, that supervision is not designed to trip you up and send you back to prison. It's there to monitor your compliance with the conditions and to ensure that you engage in a law-abiding life, but it is not designed to trip you up and send you back to prison. So I hope you'll undertake your supervision with that perspective as well.

Drug testing is addressed in Condition No. 14.

It is adjudged that the defendant is to pay the mandatory criminal assessment penalty of a hundred dollars per count, in the amount of \$200, to the clerk of court for the Western District of Wisconsin immediately following sentencing.

I do find that the defendant does not have the means to pay a fine without impairing his ability to support himself upon release from custody, so I impose no fine.

I will grant a final order of forfeiture for the property seized from the defendant as reflected in the

forfeiture order.

And I think the special assessment, was that also past, post, the commission of this crime?

MS. ALTMAN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So there's no need to consider the \$5,000 assessment. I note that Mr. Kawleski is at this point indigent as well.

All right. Probation should notify local law enforcement agencies and the state attorney general of the defendant's release to the community.

And, Mr. Kawleski, you've got the right to appeal your conviction if you think your conviction was somehow unlawful or incorrect. You've got the right to appeal the sentence I've just imposed if you think the sentence is contrary to law in some way. But if you want to appeal, you have to do it within the deadlines, and that means within 14 days of entry of judgment in this case or within 14 days of any appeal by the government if the government were to appeal.

And if you can't afford the filing fee for the appeal, you can apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, which means without paying the filing fee. And if you cannot afford an attorney, you can apply for court-appointed counsel to represent you in the appeal at government expense.

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I will recommend that you be afforded prerelease placement in a residential reentry center with work release privileges. I will also recommend that you undergo sex offender treatment programming and I will also recommend that you participate in vocational programming. I think that will help you make your way in the world after you have completed your sentence. I'm recommending that because I don't see a really well-defined skill set. I know you were employed, but I think the development of additional vocational skills I think would be useful to you, because you will face the additional burdens of entering the job market as a felon. So with that, I think we have completed everything, but let's check in. Ms. Altman, is there anything else we have to address? MS. ALTMAN: No, Your Honor. Thank you. THE COURT: Mr. Bugni, anything else? MR. BUGNI: Two things, Your Honor. Would you be so kind as to recommend RDAP as well with the vocational training? THE COURT: I will also recommend the substance abuse assessment and appropriate treatment along with RDAP, if he qualifies and he's interested. MR. BUGNI: And the second thing, Your Honor, I

never know if this actually helps at all, but Mr. Kawleski

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hasn't seen his children in two years. If we could just
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   have a recommendation of within 500 miles. I never know
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   if it really helps, but I'm sure it would alleviate the
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   family's concern.
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             THE COURT: I will recommend that Mr. Kawleski be
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   placed as close as possible to his family, consistent with
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   his security and his programming needs, but I would like
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   him to be as close as possible to his family. I think the
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   BOP does consider that, but I will add my endorsement to
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   it as well.
             MR. BUGNI: Thank you, Your Honor.
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             THE COURT:
                        All right. And, Ms. Stieve, is there
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   anything else you think I should address?
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             OFFICER STIEVE: No, Your Honor. Thank you.
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             THE COURT: Thank you all.
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         (Adjourned at 2:49 p.m.)
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I, CHERYL A. SEEMAN, Certified Realtime and Merit Reporter, in and for the State of Wisconsin, certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate record of the proceedings held on the 28th day of January, 2021, before the Honorable James D. Peterson, Chief Judge of the Western District of Wisconsin, in my presence and reduced to writing in accordance with my stenographic notes made at said time and place. Dated this 2nd day of March, 2021. /s/ Cheryl A. Seeman, RMR, CRR Federal Court Reporter The foregoing certification of this transcript does not apply to any reproduction of the same by any means unless under the direct control and/or direction of the certifying reporter.